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United States Court of Appeals







Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 
No. 09-cv-00414—Edmond E. Chang, Judge.
Argued September 18, 2012—Decided October 18, 2012
Before Flaum, SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
Flaum, Circuit Judge. After working for Continental 
Casualty Company ("Continental") for nearly twenty 
years, Howard Fleishman suffered a brain aneurism 
that required him to intermittently miss work from 2003 
to 2005. Following his medical problems, he continued 
to work on workers' compensation claims as a staff at­
torney and was assigned to a new group that handled 
high-value cases. Unfortunately for Fleishman, his super­
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complaints that ultimately led to his termination in 2007 
at the age of fifty-four. Fleishman filed suit under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 
alleging that Continental discriminated against him 
because of his age and a disability stemming from the 
aneurism. The district court granted Continental's 
motion for summary judgment, and we affirm. Fleishman 
offers no evidence of age discrimination and does not 
meet the definition of disabled under the ADA.
I. Background
Howard Fleishman began working for Continental 
Casualty Company in 1984 as a trial attorney defending 
workers' compensation claims. David Izzo oversaw the 
attorneys in Continental's Chicago staff counsel office, 
including Fleishman. Izzo reported to Jacqueline 
Johnson, who oversaw all of Continental's staff counsel 
offices. Beginning in 2003, Fleishman suffered a series of 
medical problems related to a brain aneurism. As a 
result, he took intermittent medical leaves between 
July 2003 and June 2005. In the midst of these treat­
ments, Izzo mentioned to Fleishman that his numbers 
"were off" because he was out on leave. Izzo inquired 
whether Fleishman thought about retirement and, if so, 
that Izzo would make sure he received severance. 
Fleishman declined and did not request another 
leave or accommodation after his June 2005 return, al­
though he now had a noticeable dent on the side of 
his head and could no longer drive.
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In early 2005, Continental created the Major Case Unit 
("MCU") to handle high-exposure claims and assigned 
Fleishman to the new group. He remained in the staff 
counsel office overseen by Izzo, but Fleishman prepared 
reports for adjusters in the MCU aimed at minimizing 
Continental's costs and exposure. Early in the assign­
ment, Nanette Husnik, a claims manager in the MCU, 
received complaints from adjusters about Fleishman's 
work. In mid-2005 and, upon receiving additional com­
plaints, again in 2006, Husnik relayed these complaints 
to Izzo and Johnson, both of whom confirmed the legiti­
macy of the concerns regarding Fleishman. Fleishman's 
critics were not limited to the MCU either, as claims 
specialist Rina Patel requested that Izzo transfer all of 
her work from Fleishman to another staff attorney in 
the office in March 2006. Izzo informed him of these 
concerns, and on one occasion Johnson expressed 
similar dissatisfaction to Fleishman.
These issues represented a change of course for 
Fleishman, who had performed his job duties ade­
quately until 2005. He received a performance award 
in 2003 and a raise based on his 2004 performance re­
view. However, Fleishman received a "3" on his 2005 
performance review, meaning he only met "most" expecta­
tions. This score also made him ineligible for a raise. 
Izzo discussed the review with Fleishman in the spring 
of 2006. According to Fleishman, Izzo informed him 
that Johnson made the ineligibility decision, and when 
Fleishman got upset, Izzo said "hey, she's out to get me 
too," referring to Johnson. Fleishman further testified 
that Izzo said he would talk to Mark Stevens, head of
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legal services, about getting him a raise since he 
missed time in 2005, but Izzo informed him the next 
day that Stevens said time off did not mitigate the 
issues in the evaluation unless Fleishman took short­
term disability.
Fleishman's issues persisted. Izzo continued receiving 
complaints from claims adjusters and, after reviewing 
a number of Fleishman's files, Izzo e-mailed Johnson 
informing her that he saw why the adjusters were dis­
satisfied. In September 2006, after consulting with 
Johnson and a human resources consultant, Izzo placed 
Fleishman on a performance improvement plan. The 
plan provided that if Fleishman did not improve in the 
next sixty days, Continental could take disciplinary 
action including termination. Despite these measures, 
Todd Lewis, Husnik's supervisor, complained that 
Fleishman "basically did nothing for [the MCU]." In 
response, Izzo met with Husnik who reiterated her dis­
satisfaction with Fleishman. In early 2007, Husnik 
and Lewis informed Izzo that they would not permit 
Fleishman to work on any more MCU cases. Izzo believed 
termination was the appropriate resolution to these 
issues, and after Izzo consulted with Johnson and Con­
tinental's assistant vice president of human resources, 
Fleishman's employment was terminated in Janu­
ary 2007. Izzo was forty-eight at the time, while 
Fleishman was fifty-four. Four months later, Con­
tinental hired forty-eight-year-old Patrick Cremin and 
transferred some of Fleishman's cases to him.
Shortly after his termination, Fleishman filed suit 
against Continental alleging violations of the ADEA
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and ADA. The district court granted Continental's 
motion for summary judgment, finding that Fleishman 
failed to provide direct evidence of age discrimination 
and was not disabled under the ADA. Fleishman 
timely appealed.
II. Discussion
Fleishman challenges the district court's entry of sum­
mary judgment against him on both his ADEA and 
ADA claims. The ADEA makes it unlawful for an em­
ployer to "discharge any individual . . . because of such 
individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); see also 29 U.S.C. 
§ 631(a) (limiting protections to individuals over 
forty). Similarly, the ADA prohibits an employer from 
discharging "a qualified individual on the basis of dis­
ability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Summary judgment is ap­
propriate when there is no genuine issue of material 
fact such that the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Berry v. Chi. 
Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688, 690-91 (2010). To sur­
vive summary judgment, the nonmovant must produce 
sufficient admissible evidence, taken in the light most 
favorable to it, to return a jury verdict in its fa- 
vor.1 Id. at 691. We review the district court's decision 1
1 Fleishman continually asserts that the district court relied 
exclusively on Continental's Northern District of Illinois Local 
Rule 56.1 statement of facts and incorrectly took the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the defendant. We do not see a
(continued...)
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de novo.
In discrimination cases, the plaintiff can survive sum­
mary judgment under either the direct or indirect 
method. For reasons discussed in more detail below, 
Fleishman proceeds under the direct-evidence method. 
Taken literally, direct evidence would require an admis­
sion by the employer, but we also permit circumstantial 
evidence that "points directly to a discriminatory 
reason for the employer's action." Davis v. Con-Way 
Transp. Cent. Express, Inc., 368 F.3d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 
2004) (alterations omitted). We have also called this a 
"convincing mosaic" of circumstantial evidence, but 
fundamentally the plaintiff must connect the circum­
stantial evidence to the employment action such that 
a reasonable juror could infer the employer acted for 
discriminatory reasons. See Rhodes v. Ill. Dep't o f Transp., 
359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). 1
1 (...continued)
basis for these assertions. Pursuant to the local rule, Con­
tinental submitted a list of proposed undisputed facts that 
Fleishman answered paragraph by paragraph. The district 
court is not required to disregard a fact supported by 
deposition testimony based solely on Fleishman answering 
the paragraph "denied." Additionally, taking inferences in 
favor of Fleishman does not require accepting Fleishman's 
conclusion on what a piece of evidence indicates. Rather, 
the court independently reviews the evidence and, if it creates 
an inference, we take that inference in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party.
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A. Summary Judgment Burdens
As an initial matter, the parties dispute what a 
plaintiff's summary judgment burden is in ADEA and 
ADA cases. Fleishman argues that he must produce facts 
that permit a jury to infer that discrimination was a 
"motivating factor" in his termination. However, Gross v. 
FBL Financial Services held that the ADEA's language 
proscribing discrimination "because of" age requires 
the plaintiff to prove at trial that age was the but-for 
cause of the adverse employment action. 557 U.S. 167, 176 
(2009). We followed the Supreme Court's lead in 
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. by noting the ADA's 
analogous language likewise requires plaintiffs bear the 
ultimate burden of persuasion to show but-for causa­
tion. 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010).
Because summary judgment is designed to determine 
if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party," Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), our post-Gross 
cases now require plaintiffs in ADEA cases to show 
evidence that could support a jury verdict that age was 
a but-for cause of the employment action at the sum­
mary judgment stage. See, e.g., Barton v. Zimmer, Inc., 662 
F.3d 448, 455-56 (7th Cir. 2011). Our sister circuits 
have done the same. See, e.g., Tusing v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 639 F.3d 504, 514-15 (8th Cir. 2011); 
Mora v. Jackson Mem'l Fund, 597 F.3d 1201, 1203-04 (10th 
Cir. 2010); Schuler v. Price Waterhouse Coopers, LLP, 595 
F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Kelly v. Moser, Patterson 
and Sheridan, LLP, 348 F. App'x 746, 749-50 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Accordingly, we similarly extend Serwatka's ADA causa­
tion requirement at trial to the summary judgment 
stage, meaning Fleishman must produce evidence per­
mitting a jury to infer his age was a but-for cause of 
his termination.
We pause to note that this holding accords with 
other recent discrimination and employment cases that 
proceed differently at the summary judgment stage. 
First, constitutional claims, such as First Amendment 
retaliation cases, continue to proceed under the Mt. 
Healthy burden-shifting framework. Greene v. Doruff, 
660 F.3d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Mt. Healthy Bd. o f 
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)); see also Gross, 
557 U.S. at 179 n.6 (noting the decision does not alter 
constitutional cases that proceed under Mt. Healthy). 
Second, we have continued to apply the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework in summary judg­
ment cases that proceed under the indirect method of 
proof, a question Gross explicitly left open. See, e.g., Senske 
v. Sybase, 588 F.3d 501, 506-07 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)) 
(applying Gross's but-for causation standard through 
the McDonnell Douglas framework); see also Gross, 557 
U.S. at 175 n.2 (leaving question open); Shelley v. Geren, 
666 F.3d 599, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2012) ("nothing in Gross 
overruled our cases utilizing [the McDonnell Douglas] 
framework to decide summary judgment motions in 
ADEA cases").
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B. ADEA Claim
Having established Fleishman's burden, we turn to his 
claims. With respect to the ADEA claim, Fleishman 
points to a few pieces of evidence he argues satisfy his 
burden: Izzo's comment that Johnson wanted to "get 
him too," Izzo's offer of retirement and severance at 
the onset of Fleishman's medical problems, and older 
lawyers' departure from Continental.
In 2006, Izzo reviewed Fleishman's 2005 performance 
review in which Johnson gave Fleishman a score that 
made him ineligible for a raise. Izzo responded to 
Fleishman's displeasure by stating "hey, she's out to 
get me too," referring to Johnson. This comment falls 
considerably short of evidencing discrimination. First, 
this comment is ambiguous; it is devoid of any indica­
tion that Johnson's alleged motivations were age re­
lated. We reached a nearly identical conclusion in a 
previous case. See Mills v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of 
Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir. 1996) (absent 
age-related context, statement that management was 
"out to get [the two oldest employees]" alone was not 
direct evidence of discrimination even if the plaintiff 
interpreted it as age motivated). The ambiguity alone 
obviates this comment's relevance, but moreover, 
isolated comments are not probative of discrimination 
unless they are "contemporaneous with the discharge 
or causally related to the discharge decision-making 
process." Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 
1140 (7th Cir. 1997). This comment is not con­
temporaneous because it came ten months before
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Fleishman's termination. See Market v. Bd. o f Regents 
of Univ. o f Wis. Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 910-11 (2001) (two 
months before termination not contemporaneous); 
Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 
716, 724 (7th Cir. 1998) (five months not contemporane­
ous). More importantly, there is no connection between 
it and the termination decision. Fleishman fails to 
explain how this comment relates to Continental's deci­
sions, when the record reflects a clear, causally con­
nected chain of events beginning with Husnik's and 
others' complaints about Fleishman's work, leading to 
Izzo's investigations into these concerns, and ending 
with Izzo's decision to terminate Fleishman for 
inadequate performance. See Marshall v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 
157 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 1998) (requiring plaintiff 
to connect noncontemporaneous comments to the em­
ployer's decision). Finally, even if Johnson's com­
ment indicates she harbors age-related animus, she 
did not decide to fire Fleishman; Izzo did. And a 
nondecisionmaker's animus is not evidence that the 
employer's actions were on account of the plaintiff's 
age. Metzger v. Ill. State Police, 519 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir.
2008) ; Davis, 368 F.3d at 789. With respect to the last 
point, Fleishman argues under the cat's paw theory 
that Johnson's animus as a nondecisionmaker proxi­
mately caused Izzo's termination. See generally Martino 
v. MCI Commc'ns Servs., Inc., 574 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir.
2009) (explaining the cat's paw theory). Fleishman 
limits this argument to one conclusory sentence, and 
he presents no facts supporting his theory that Johnson 
influenced the termination.
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Next, Fleishman argues Izzo attempted to "coerce" 
him to retire. Fleishman grounds this argument in 
his 2004 conversation with Izzo where, in the middle 
of Fleishman's medical treatments, Izzo spoke to 
Fleishman about his declining numbers and asked 
Flieshman if he considered retirement.2 Izzo promised 
he would receive severance if he decided to do so. Like 
the previous comment, however, this conversation is 
unconnected to a desire to remove Fleishman because 
of his age. A far more likely explanation is Fleishman's 
formerly adequate work fell off considerably at the 
time of his medical treatments, and Izzo, concerned 
Fleishman could no longer handle the workload, 
informed him that retirement would come with 
severance pay. Notwithstanding, over two years 
passed between this single comment and Fleishman's 
termination. This lapse in time obviates any connection 
between the comment and discharge when there is an 
intervening, legal reason for the termination—the 
external complaints to Izzo and Fleishman's inade-
2 Fleishman disappointingly makes the disingenuous asser­
tion that Continental "badgered" and "continuously" attempted 
to get him to retire. To the contrary, Fleishman only testified 
to this single conversation in 2004. Fleishman responded 
to the question "[is there] anything besides [the 2004 re­
tirement conversation]" that "makes you believe that [Izzo] 
discriminated against you" by saying "[t]hat's all I can recall 
right now[;] I've had other conversations, but they don't come 
to me right now." This deposition testimony does not 
support counsel's assertions.
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quate performance. See Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 
238, 242 (7th Cir. 1996) (comments urging employee 
to "have all the kids you would like[ ]between spring, 
summer, and fall" lacked "causal nexus" to the termina­
tion because it was made a full year before the termina­
tion in a setting unrelated to the ultimate gravamen of 
the termination). Moreover, "suggestion[s] of retirement 
do[] not rise to the level of direct evidence of age dis­
crimination" when there is an alternative explanation 
for the employment action. Kaniff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
121 F.3d 258, 263 (7th Cir. 1997) (retirement offered as 
alternative to termination for improper conduct); see also 
Pitasi v. Gartner Grp., 184 F.3d 709, 714-15 (7th Cir. 1999) 
("What would you think if we gave you early retirement, 
with some extra compensation because of your age?" 
offered as an alternative to laying plaintiff off was 
not discriminatory). Here, Izzo offered Fleishman sever­
ance, he declined, Fleishman continued to work, 
other employees began complaining about his perfor­
mance, and then Izzo terminated him because of his 
performance. Like the other comment, this does not 
create any inference that Continental fired Fleishman 
because of his age.
Finally, Fleishman cursorily mentions a pattern of age 
discrimination. This argument is ostensibly related to a 
page in his statement of facts that notes ten lawyers 
between forty and sixty-five are "now gone from the 
Chicago office." Fleishman waived this argument 
because he "fail[ed] to develop the factual basis of [the] 
claim on appeal and, instead, merely draws and relies
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upon bare conclusions." Muhich v. Commissioner, 238 F.3d 
860, 864 n.10 (7th Cir. 2001). Notwithstanding, it lacks 
merit, as nothing connects these employees' departures 
to prohibited conduct (or even evidence Continental 
played a role in the decision). One would expect older 
employees to naturally leave their employers. Without 
more, this occurrence is not evidence of discrimination.
C. ADA Claim
Next, we turn to the ADA claim. The ADA prohibits 
employers from taking adverse employment actions 
against their employees because of a disability. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(a). To succeed, Fleishman must be disabled 
under the ADA, which defines disability as: "(A) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a 
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded 
as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).3
3 We decide this case under the ADA standards prior to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act ("ADAAA"), 
Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008), because Continental 
terminated Fleishman's employment before the ADAAA's 
enactment. See Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 581 F.3d 516, 
521 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009). We note, however, the ADAAA broad­
ened the ADA's protection by superseding portions of Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) to, inter alia, 
include a wider range of impairments that substantially limit a
(continued...)
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Fleishman argues that his aneurism constitutes a 
disability and, additionally, Continental regarded him
as having a disability.
1. Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity
Fleishman has not produced evidence that his 
aneurism limits a major life activity. In his motion 
before the district court, Fleishman merely cited the 
Wikipedia article on aneurisms and concluded that the 
"ability to function and live is certainly a major life func­
tion." As both the district court and Fleishman's appel­
late brief recognize, however, determining whether a 
plaintiff has a disability is made on an individualized 
basis. Thus, the existence of a medical condition alone 
is insufficient to satisfy the ADA. Toyota Motor Mfg. 
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (holding "[i]t is insuf­
ficient for individuals . . . to merely submit evidence of 
a medical diagnosis of an impairment. . . . [T]he ADA 
requires . . . evidence that the extent of the limitation 
caused by their impairment in terms of their own ex­
perience is substantial" (alterations omitted)), superseded 3
3 (...continued)
major life activity. See Pub. L. 110-325 § II(a)(4)-(6). Accordingly, 
although Fleishman notes he was unable to drive during the 
period leading up to his termination, driving was not 
considered a major life activity prior to the adoption of the 
AD AAA. Winsley v. Cook Cnty., 563 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 2009). 
And in any event, Fleishman did not raise this argument in 
the district court.
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in part by Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); Burnett 
v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Tice v. 
Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2001) 
("It is well-established that a particular diagnosis, no 
matter how severe (or severe-sounding to the lay­
person), standing alone, is not sufficient to establish 
'disability.' Rather, the inquiry as to disability is to be 
made on a case-by-case basis.") (alterations omitted)). 
Fleishman cannot rely on "the name or diagnosis of 
the impairment"; rather, he must show "the effect of that 
impairment on" him. Burnett, 472 F.3d at 483. Under 
this standard, Fleishman's bare assertion that his 
aneurism constitutes a disability is insufficient.
For the first time on appeal, Fleishman now 
contends that the aneurism limited his ability to work. 
He cites his 2005 performance review downgrading his 
score because he missed time. Fleishman waived this 
claim because he only argued the aneurism affected his 
ability to "function and live" in the district court. Not­
withstanding, Fleishman testified at his deposition that 
his aneurism only prevented him from working for por­
tions of 2003, 2004, and early 2005, but his condition 
did not prevent him from working from June 2005 until 
his termination in January 2007. And although he could 
not drive during that period, Fleishman stated in his 
deposition that he "went to all the status calls, [he] 
did [his] regular job, [and he] didn't ask for any accom­
modations" in 2005 or 2006. Although Fleishman's 
medical problems formerly affected his ability to work, 
they did not, by his own admission, limit his ability
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to work nearly eighteen months leading up to his ter­
mination. Thus, Fleishman did not have a disability at 
the time of his termination. See Patterson v. Chi. Ass'n 
for Retarded Citizens, 150 F.3d 719, 726 (7th Cir. 1998) 
("Patterson cannot argue that she is substantially 
restricted in her ability to work as a teacher, . . . because 
the undisputed evidence establishes that immediately 
upon her termination . . . Patterson was and has 
continued to be regularly employed as a teacher within 
the Chicago Public School system.").
2. Regarded as Disabled
Fleishman also contends Continental regarded him as 
having a disability. To succeed on this claim, he must 
establish that either (1) "the employer mistakenly 
believe[d] that [he] ha[d] an impairment that sub­
stantially limits a major life activity," or (2) "the em­
ployer mistakenly believe[d] that an existing impair­
ment, which is not actually limiting, does substantially 
limit a major life activity." Brunker v. Schwan's Home 
Serv., Inc., 583 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2009). Fleishman 
suggests that Continental did not believe he could 
work because, after twenty years of successful employ­
ment, its employees began criticizing his work and Izzo 
asked him if he considered retirement. As the district 
court explained, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests 
otherwise—at all times during and after his medical 
leave Continental continued to employ Fleishman as a 
workers' compensation attorney and, in fact, transferred
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him to the newly created Major Claims Unit designed 
to handle high-value cases. Fleishman is correct that the 
evidence suggests Izzo and others knew Fleishman 
had medical problems related to his aneurism. But 
nothing suggests that anyone at Continental thought 
this condition substantially affected his ability to earn 
a living. Even amidst the performance complaints, Izzo 
placed Fleishman on a performance improvement plan. 
This measure indicates that, although Fleishman's 
work was suffering, Izzo believed he was capable of 
performing adequately.
3. Accommodation Claim
On appeal, Fleishman begins weaving arguments into 
his brief that Continental failed to accommodate his 
disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) ("the term discrimi­
nated against a qualified individual on the basis of dis­
ability includes—not making reasonable accommoda­
tions to the known physical or mental limitations of 
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability" 
(internal quotations omitted)). Again, because Fleishman 
is not disabled, this claim fails. But more importantly, 
he failed to raise it in his complaint, let alone his brief 
in the district court. And further, "the standard rule is 
that a plaintiff must normally request an accommoda­
tion before liability under the ADA attaches," Jovanovic 
v. Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 2000), 
and Fleishman never did so.
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D. Indirect Evidence of Discrimination
In the district court, Fleishman acknowledged that he 
could survive summary judgment under either the 
direct or indirect methods before asserting "[w]e seek to 
establish intentional discrimination under the direct 
method of proof." On appeal, he now asserts a theory of 
indirect discrimination (at least under the ADEA), which 
is waived. In responding to Continental's waiver argu­
ments, Fleishman misunderstands the waiver doctrine.
Fleishman first asserts he presented everything on 
which his appellate brief relies in his Northern District 
of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts. But the 
waiver doctrine charges litigants with raising the argu­
ments they present on appeal in the district court, not just 
the facts on which their appellate arguments will rely. 
See Bus. Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 547 
F.3d 882, 889 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008). Fleishman's positions 
are legal arguments urging us to deny summary judg­
ment, and thus, wavier applies. See also Weber v. Univs. 
Research Ass'n, Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(Weber waived proof by the direct method by failing 
to develop the argument in the district court).
In light of these issues, Fleishman urges us to consider 
his arguments. Although Fleishman is correct that the 
waiver rule is prudential and not jurisdictional, it 
serves important interests. By requiring litigants to 
raise their arguments in the district court, we, for 
example, prevent parties from getting two bites at the 
apple by raising two distinct arguments before each 
court, incentivize the presentation of well-reasoned
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motions in the district court, and avoid unnecessary 
costs to the courts and parties by avoiding appeals that 
could have been decided below. Thus, we enforce the 
rule unless the "interests of justice" require otherwise. 
Judge v. Quinn, 624 F.3d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 2010). Such 
examples include where "failure to consider the 
alleged error would result in a miscarriage of justice," 
"the equities heavily preponderate in favor of correcting 
it," or "there was a plain error that seriously affected 
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the 
judicial proceedings." See 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 458 
(footnotes omitted) (compiling cases).
In any event, a brief review of Fleishman's ADEA 
indirect evidence claim reveals it lacks merit. The 
indirect method of proof proceeds under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, which requires Fleishman to show 
that (1) "he was meeting his employer's legitimate ex­
pectations," (2) "he suffered an adverse employment 
action," and (3) "similarly situated, substantially younger 
employees were treated more favorably." Franzoni v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 300 F.3d 767, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2002). If 
successful, the defendant must provide a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the action. Id. The 
plaintiff then must show that there is an issue of fact 
whether this reason is pretextual. Id. Relying on a case 
in which we assumed arguendo that the plaintiff had 
established a prima facie case because he could not estab­
lish pretext, Fleishman remarkably skips this entire 
first step—asserting he "may skip over the initial bur­
den-shifting of the indirect method and focus on 
the question of pretext." But his claim fails because he
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cannot skip that step. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that younger employees were treated more favorably. 
In his statement of facts he relies on his faster 
case-closure rate than Marcy Singer-Ruiz and Steve 
Trotto, but both these individuals were close to 
Fleishman in age (forty-four and forty-eight respec­
tively), and they received higher evaluation scores 
during the time in question. Thus, they were neither 
similarly situated nor substantially younger. For all of 
these reasons, this argument fails.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district 
court's decision.
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